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Brand new Book. Seller Inventory LHB Book Description Praeger, New Book. Delivered from our UK warehouse in 4 to 14 business days. Established seller since Seller Inventory IQ Seller Inventory APC Franz Oswald. Publisher: Praeger , This specific ISBN edition is currently not available. View all copies of this ISBN edition:. Synopsis About this title Oswald argues that European security autonomy will lead to a more balanced transatlantic partnership, even though American military might will remain far superior.
Review : "Oswald analyzes international security aspects of US-European relations, arguing that an emergent Europe is now capable of managing its own security, allowing the US to disengage its military presence and adapt to a more balanced transatlantic partnership. An understanding of this process is key to an American foreign policy that recognises Europe as a strategic actor in its own right, an indispensable ally with its own military and nonmilitary instruments of crisis management.
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We expect our European allies to increase defense spending to 2 percent of gross domestic product by , with 20 percent of this spending devoted to increasing military capabilities. We will work with NATO to improve its integrated air and missile defense capabilities to counter existing and projected ballistic and cruise missile threats, particularly from Iran. We will increase counterterrorism and cybersecurity cooperation.
It too describes Russia's role as one of the key threats to the U. The central challenge to U.
Russia seeks veto authority over nations on its periphery in terms of their governmental, economic, and diplomatic decisions, to shatter the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and change European and Middle East security and economic structures to its favor. The use of emerging technologies to discredit and subvert democratic processes in Georgia, Crimea, and eastern Ukraine is concern enough, but when coupled with its expanding and modernizing nuclear arsenal the challenge is clear. Another change to the strategic environment is a resilient, but weakening, post-WWII international order.
Although this system has evolved since the end of the Cold War, our network of alliances and partnerships remain the backbone of global security. We face an ever more lethal and disruptive battlefield, combined across domains, and conducted at increasing speed and reach—from close combat, throughout overseas theaters, and reaching to our homeland.
Some competitors and adversaries seek to optimize their targeting of our battle networks and operational concepts, while also using other areas of competition short of open warfare to achieve their ends e. These trends, if unaddressed, will challenge our ability to deter aggression. The security environment is also affected by rapid technological advancements and the changing character of war. The drive to develop new technologies is relentless, expanding to more actors with lower barriers of entry, and moving at accelerating speed.
New commercial technology will change society and, ultimately, the character of war. The fact that many technological developments will come from the commercial sector means that state competitors and non-state actors will also have access to them, a fact that risks eroding the conventional overmatch to which our Nation has grown accustomed.
Mutually beneficial alliances and partnerships are crucial to our strategy, providing a durable, asymmetric strategic advantage that no competitor or rival can match. This approach has served the United States well, in peace and war, for the past 75 years. Every day, our allies and partners join us in defending freedom, deterring war, and maintaining the rules which underwrite a free and open international order By working together with allies and partners we amass the greatest possible strength for the long-term advancement of our interests, maintaining favorable balances of power that deter aggression and support the stability that generates economic growth.
When we pool resources and share responsibility for our common defense, our security burden becomes lighter. Our allies and partners provide complementary capabilities and forces along with unique perspectives, regional relationships, and information that improve our understanding of the environment and expand our options. We will strengthen and evolve our alliances and partnerships into an extended network capable of deterring or decisively acting to meet the shared challenges of our time A strong and free Europe, bound by shared principles of democracy, national sovereignty, and commitment to Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty is vital to our security.
At the same time, NATO must adapt to remain relevant and fit for our time—in purpose, capability, and responsive decision-making. We expect European allies to fulfill their commitments to increase defense and modernization spending to bolster the alliance in the face of our shared security concerns. Many Europeans and Americans may not like President Trump's style or use of Tweets, bit it is critical to note that his strategy documents make it clear that "America First" calls for a revitalization of American leadership and not a retreat from the world.
It is equally important to note that they firmly reassert the primacy of the U. Many European Ministers of Defense, and senior European commanders make the same points — although they focus more on real world military capabilities than percentage of GDP and spending on new weapons. Any analysis of the level of U. There are limits to such comparisons because they have to be made in terms of actual spending past years, and cannot reflect the massive rises in U.
As the IISS and SIPRI data show, virtually every source of comparative estimates defense spending also uses at least slightly different definitions and produces different figures. NATO now focuses at the Ministerial level on some of the worst possible metrics of military effort, and ones that do nothing to portray real world military capability. These include defense spending as a percent of GDP and equipment expenditure as a percent of defense expenditure.
sorkeypokostnorth.gq: Europe and the United States: The Emerging Security Partnership (Praeger Security International) () by Franz Oswald and a. Buy Europe and the United States: The Emerging Security Partnership at sorkeypokostnorth.gq and the recasting of roles in a new transatlantic security partnership.
They included 9 countries in the forward area and most vulnerable to Russia. They also include Germany, which once was the core of NATO forces in the Central Region, and which has the most successful economy in Europe, and 9 other highly successful European economies.
Here, the United Kingdom is a key example. The new Defense Committee report also recognized bot the importance of the United State role in European defense, and that Britain had to spend more to be an effective partner. However, that will continue to be true only while the UK military retains both the capacity and capability to maintain interoperability with the U. Similarly, figures like the German Defense Minister Ursula von der Leyen have made it clear that going from 1.
Griff Witte, " Merkel and Trump agree the ailing German military needs a boost. At present, however, many of its units lack the readiness to move as effective combat forces, its submarines are partly operational at best, along with half of its Leopard 2 tanks. Many of its other armored vehicles lack machine guns, and its pilots have had to borrow commercial helicopters.
Such a level of effort goal may have been marginally better than no goal at all when there was no Russian or terrorist threat. In a world where there are always competing and well-defined needs and demands, it is about as pointless as any exercise in governance can get.
These include several highly advanced economies, and countries near Russia. But seeing the low percentages does not imply that any credible rise could fix the impact of years of underspending. In short, NATO is focused on a metric which is little more than statistical rubbish.
They may serve some purpose in flagging gross underspending, but there is no reason that meeting both goals should be particularly useful or rewarding. There is no way to know what "more" buys, or what "less" cost in terms of actual military capability. The data on total NATO defense spending by country are a different story.
They do show comparative level of effort, and they again flag the critical importance of the US role in shaping alliance military spending.
This led the U. To put it bluntly, these data show there is no credible chance that NATO Europe can approach the total spending levels of the U. The country spending data also compare total spending in both current and constant dollars.
In some ways, the trends in total defense expenditures turn out to be more reassuring than the nearly meaningless percentage metrics.